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Abstract
In his editorial, Nir Eyal argues that a nudge can exploit our propensity to feel shame in order to steer us toward 
certain choices. We object that shame is a cost and therefore cannot figure in the apparatus of a nudge. 
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Introduction
In his thought-provoking editorial (1), Nir Eyal shows that 
a nudge may be related to our propensity to feel shame in 
two different ways. A nudge may, firstly, promote certain 
choices by making others shameful. The fear of shame 
could, as Eyal illustrates, deter people from smoking in the 
area dedicated to their habit, from neglecting to take their 
pills in the presence of treatment observers, from going for a 
soda refill or from requesting to be treated by a senior staff 
member at the hospital. Having people choose option a can 
thus be achieved by associating option b with an experience 
of shamee. A nudge may, secondly, elicit guilt as a perverse 
effect. This is because the choice it promotes is the sort for 
which one remains fully responsible. This is arguably an 
appealing aspect of being nudged when things go well (do 
not we like to choose?). Not so in the contrary case, however. 
No mild consolation partly compensating for the fatality of 
a surgery will be available on consideration that one did not 
have any choice. Guilt will ensue.
Eyal takes the second relation to be “more critical” than 
the first one. However, history abounds of unappealing 
shaming practices, that is, of deliberate elicitations of 
shame (2–4), in light of which the first connection looks as 
troublesome. Moreover, because these practices are usually 
viewed as penalties, their accommodation within the soft 
realm of nudges can be questioned. In order to be compatible 
with nudges, the use of shaming would have to meet a few 
constraints. It will have, in particular, to promote options 
without neither banning others nor significantly changing 
agents’ incentives. Whether shaming meets the second 
assumption is questionable and is the focus on the present 
commentary. I show that shame is a cost in the relevant sense 
and thus cannot figure in the apparatus of nudges. I shall 
however make a few remarks about the first requirement, 
namely, the absence of a ban, as some of the cases considered 
by Eyal seem to contradict it.  
Shaming and banning
Banning smoking in the workplace, or within thirty feet of 
an entrance, is what it is: a ban on smoking. And so is the ban 
on the sale of  large cups of sugary soda. These examples thus 
seem to misfit the category of nudges, which, by definition, 
do not forbid any options.
Even if they involve some restriction, it remains possible, 
however, to view these two cases as eligible instances of 
nudges. This is because the ban constraints, rather than 
prohibits, certain behaviours. Indeed, the smoker is not 
forbidden to smoke but to smoke at a certain place. Smoking 
is thus an option that remains available to him, only at the 
price of a few more steps. Likewise, New Yorkers are not 
forbidden to drink and, in fact, they can drink the amount 
of soda they want. They will just have to refill their cups 
more often than they would have in the absence of a ban on 
certain size of cups. In both cases, the ban does impact on 
the behaviour of people but without blocking any options. It 
should therefore be compatible with a nudge.
The cost of shame 
To serve in nudging, an experience of shame would have to 
be (nearly) costless and this does not seem to be the case. 
Shame is indeed a cost in two relevant senses. First, it is 
utterly unpleasant. No one will find the experience of shame, 
guilt or embarrassment desirable. Shame is certainly the 
most unbearable of these so-called social emotions (5–7), 
judging among others by the number of suicides it causes. 
To be embarrassed is to be only mildly unhappy even if it 
is to be very much aroused, that is, to undergo intense and 
durable physiological changes. The latter have, in turn, many 
costly effects on attention span (8). The difference may be 
that, unlike shame and guilt, embarrassment is caused by 
mere exposure to others, without any evaluation of oneself 
being involved (9,10). It is embarrassing to stain one’s skirt, 
but what ideal or principle did I violate when I let the tomato 
sauce drop onto it? All instances of social emotions are, to 
some extent, painful both in terms of negative valence and 
arousal. It therefore makes sense to construe them, as some 
economists do, as physic costs (11,12). 
Another reason to consider shame as a cost is the possibility 
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to subject it to a cost-benefit analysis [(11,12), see also (7) 
for a critical view on this approach]. The smoker weights 
the emotional dissatisfaction of embarrassment against the 
satisfaction of smoking. The patient balances the benefits 
of not taking her pills with the cost of having to face the 
treatment observer’s witnessing him. The cost-benefit model 
of emotion nicely accounts for these trade-offs between the 
fear of shame and self-interested considerations. It presents 
the advantage of accounting for the fact that many smokers 
do not go on with their habit at all cost but only when the 
pleasure of smoking is sufficiently high to trump the 
discomfort of being the focus of other’s gaze. 
If a shameful choice is, as we argue, a costly experience, the 
difference between an experience of shame and a fine ceases 
to be obvious. There are however various ways of resisting 
this conclusion, which will next be critically reviewed. 
Mild shame
One may first argue that, if a small increase of cost really is 
acceptable as a nudge, as their proponents say (13), the cost 
of shame will only have to be low enough for figuring among 
the mechanisms of nudges. A choice architect who considers 
using shame as a nudge will make sure its discomfort is 
sufficiently mild to keep the incentives unchanged. For this, 
he may organize the context so that a subtle embarrassment 
is more likely to be elicited than more a acutely painful guilt 
or a shame, which are too distressing to be employed as 
a nudge.
One may however object that it is too optimistic to assume 
that emotions can be elicited in others with that degree of 
precision. While we may predict that patients will be steered 
away from neglecting to take their treatments by having 
them exposed to an audience, less easy to control, it seems, 
will be the specific nature of the emotions that will be elicited 
in this manner, and let alone its intensity, both of which will 
depend on various unpredictable idiosyncratic factors. An 
innocuous embarrassment may unpredictably misfire into a 
much more painful and costly humiliation, or, alternatively, 
into anger (14) in a way that is not systematically predictable, 
even less so controllable. 
Unconscious shame
Another way of avoiding to recognize to cost of shame and 
thus its eligibility as a nudge would be to distinguish between 
two ways it could support certain options. One is when it 
is consciously anticipated as a painful, costly experience. 
Shame, in this case, consciously operates on our mind in a 
way that is not different from a fine. Alternatively, it may be 
suggested, shame may unconsciously prompts certain choice 
but not via reflection. In this latter case, shame influences 
our behaviour without being an element of conscious 
deliberation. The latter kind of shame, it may be argued in 
response to our objection, is a nudge while the former is not. 
The idea that emotions can unconsciously weigh on our 
decision-making is however controversial (16). What 
could it possibly mean to say that the soda drinker’s fear 
of embarrassment unconsciously drives her to renounce 
to another refill? One possibility would be that, unlike 
the fear she feels when she watches a horror movie, her 
fear of embarrassment triggers no physiological change 
(17). Another possibility would be that she is conceptually 
confused so that she mistakes the guilt she actually fears for 
a case of embarrassment. Either way, shame has a negative 
valence and is thus correctly construed as a cost.
Felt as dread but objectively a trifle
Still another way to get around the problem of the cost of 
social emotions is to argue, as Eyal does, that their fear 
“pressures us more than it should” or, as he also says, that a 
social stigma is “objectively a trifle but which we dread” (1). 
Consider the smoker who renounces to his habit for fear of 
another’s gaze. Is not he according too much significance 
to the opinions of others when in fact they may not even 
be giving him a second glance? The idea is that we are 
disproportionally averse to shame. Only someone whose 
rationality is severely bounded will seriously risk death 
or even injury just to avoid embarrassment. However 
unpleasant asking for a well-trained surgeon might be, it 
is clearly nothing in comparison to the fatalities of a failed 
surgery. Yet we are prone to reach the opposite conclusion. 
The fear of shame biases us toward options we have no 
objective reason to choose (7). This fear, therefore, qualifies 
as the sort of irrational propensities that a nudge may exploit 
for the sake of our own good. 
The argument, one may reply, makes the uneasy assumption 
that people mistakenly assess the cost of shame when they 
fear it. But the notion of cost is too subjective for allowing 
any error of commission (i.e. ascribing cost to objectively 
costless option) of this type. It is enough that someone prefers 
avoiding embarrassment, one may argue, for the latter to 
raise the cost of smoking in the smoking area. 
One may also object that shame can enter into decision-
making without necessarily affecting the rationality of choice 
itself. The benefit of avoiding another’s withering glance 
may be greater, after all, than the rather brief delight of a 
nicotine high. And why should not it be acceptable to find 
the diminishing marginal pleasure of another glass of soft 
drink not worth the discomfort, however objectively low the 
latter might be, of suffering an episode of embarrassment? 
While it is true that emotions often distort our judgement 
about what is in our interest to do, all cases discussed by 
Eyal might not be illustrative of this admittedly well-known 
subverting power.
Finally, one may say that when shame does hinder our 
practical judgement, its importance will not, or not only, 
be overestimated as Eyal suggests. Anticipated shame may 
as likely be weighted insufficiently rather than too much 
(7). Someone craving for nicotine after a ten hours flight 
could easily underestimate how embarrassing displaying her 
addiction in the glass-widowed smoking area will be.
Conclusion
By highlighting the deterring role that shame plays in certain 
nudges, Eyal has not only casted light on their emotional 
functioning, he also has drawn our attention, even if 
unintentionally, to their hidden cost. After having looked at 
various inconclusive ways of making such cost compatible 
with the soft realm of nudges, we may conclude that a nudge 
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may not be as cheap to avoid as it is supposed to be.
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